

eral Buell by which the forces of both commanders could be employed against the enemy on the lines of operation proposed, which, if practicable, certainly promised the greatest advantages. This was, in fact, finally recognized by Halleck himself. The truth is, General Halleck had his time and thoughts fully occupied with the affairs of Missouri. It was a great mistake on McClellan's part that he did not entrust Buell with the entire control of all the forces in Kentucky and Tennessee. Buell was able from his central position at Louisville to take a general view of the whole theatre of war in those States. He very early saw the importance of a comprehensive scheme for the defeat of the Confederate forces and the recovery of the two States ; and he was one of the first to appreciate the advantages which might be gained by making use of the two great rivers which intersected the line occupied by his antagonist. General Buell's views, however, as we have observed above, were not understood by General McClellan, who, preoccupied as his mind was with an invasion of East Tennessee as auxiliary to his own campaign against Richmond, failed to catch the real meaning of his subordinate's letters. But in the telegram to the President, on January

5th, General
Buell stated distinctly that he had
always doubted
the wisdom of the East Tennessee project,
"as an
unconditional measure. As earnestly as I
wish to
accomplish it," he said, "my judgment has
from the
first been decidedly against it, if it should
render at
all doubtful the success of a movement
against the